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The Caloric Costs of Culture: Evidence from  
Indian Migrants†
By David Atkin*
Anthropologists have documented substantial and persistent 
differences in food preferences across social groups. My paper 
asks whether such food cultures can constrain caloric intake? 
I first document that interstate migrants within India consume 
fewer calories per rupee of food expenditure compared to their 
neighbors. Second, I show that migrants bring their origin-state food 
preferences with them. Third, I link these findings by showing that the 
gap in caloric intake between locals and migrants depends on the 
suitability and intensity of the migrants’ origin-state preferences. The 
most affected migrants would consume seven percent more calories 
if they possessed their neighbors’ preferences. (JEL D12, I12, O15, 
R23, Z12, Z13)
Anthropologists have long documented substantial and persistent differences 
across social groups in the preferences and taboos for particular foods. For example, 
Harris (1985) analyzes the historic origin of the taboo on beef consumption that per-
sists among Hindus today, while Prakash (1961) notes that the relative preference 
for wheat in Northwest India and rice in East India dates back to the first millennium 
AD. Consistent with the cultural economics literature, I will describe differences 
in food preferences across groups as different food cultures.1 One natural question 
to ask is whether such food cultures can constrain caloric intake and contribute to 
malnutrition? Such a question is of interest both for understanding the value that 
households place on their culture, and for designing effective policies to improve 
nutrition.
A stark example of the willingness of households to trade off cultural food pref-
erences for nutrition, and an ineffective policy that did not take such preferences 
into account, comes from the Famine Inquiry Commission. The commission was 
established in the aftermath of the 1943 Bengal Famine in which between 1.5 and 
1 Since the types of food a group of people traditionally consumes embody the preferences, beliefs, and social 
attitudes of the group, this definition accords the existing definitions of culture in the economics literature (see 
Section IC for further details). 
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4 million Bengalis died. The final chapter of the commission’s report centered on 
the role of regional preferences in exacerbating the famine:
During the famine large supplies of wheat and millets were sent to Bengal 
… but efforts to persuade people to eat them in their homes in place of 
rice met with little success … we visited numerous grain stores in which 
quantities of wheat were deteriorating for lack of demand. … The problem 
of how to wean rice-eaters from their determined preference from a food 
in short supply and reluctance to turn to alternative grains is not peculiar 
to Bengal, but is of all-India importance. (Famine Inquiry Commission 
1945)
The goal of this paper is to understand whether culture can constrain caloric 
intake and contribute to malnutrition. In order to do so, I require a setting where 
people are sufficiently hungry that reductions in caloric intake can have health, 
and hence economic, repercussions. Accordingly, I focus on India, where I observe 
many households on the edge of malnutrition. This setting allows me to investigate 
whether culture can constrain caloric intake by observing the number of calories 
hungry households forgo in order to accommodate their food culture. My analysis 
compares the consumption patterns of interstate migrants with those of their nonmi-
grant neighbors who face the same prices but possess different cultural food prefer-
ences. This methodology allows me to broadly quantify the “costs” that culture can 
impose.
The interpretation of this cost depends on whether households are knowingly 
trading-off calories for the utility gained from cultural practice. If they are, then 
this cost is a measure of the strength of their cultural preferences. I provide sup-
port for this interpretation by showing that migrants moderate their consumption 
choices in contexts where consuming their favored foods is most disadvantageous. 
Alternatively, if households are unaware or undervalue the (often later-life) health 
consequences of low caloric intake, this cost may correspond to a welfare cost of 
culture. Of course, both interpretations require that caloric costs correspond to nutri-
tional costs, an issue I discuss in depth and provide direct evidence for.
The key observation for my empirical strategy is that migrants face the same 
prices as their neighbors but bring their cultural food preferences with them when 
they migrate. To use that observation to analyze the caloric costs of culture, I require 
a dataset that has: (i) information on household consumption across many food 
products; (ii) matched to the migrant status of household members including their 
origin locations; (iii) with a large sample of migrants and nonmigrants across many 
finely-specified locations; and (iv) in a country with both malnourishment and 
diverse regional food preferences.
The 1983 and 1987–1988 Indian National Sample Surveys (NSS) satisfy all four 
of these criteria. The surveys record household purchases of 169 different food 
products alongside migration particulars. Over 240,000 households are surveyed in 
groups of 10 drawn from blocks of no more than 180 neighboring households within 
a village or city: ensuring that migrant and nonmigrant households face very similar 
prices, an assumption I test explicitly. The surveys cover all states of India, a country 
with many different food cultures across religious, caste, and ethnolinguistic groups. 
(In contrast, later Indian survey rounds either ask households about  consumption or 
migrations but not both, while the equivalent surveys in equally large and diverse 
1146 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW ApRIl 2016
China are neither publicly available nor do they record the required migration par-
ticulars.) And finally, I show that at the time of the surveys, childhood malnutrition 
rates were above 50 percent and 64 percent of households consumed fewer calories 
than the nutritional adequacy requirements used to determine India’s poverty line. If 
undernourished households are not maximizing nutrition in this setting, it is import-
ant to understand why.
The analysis proceeds in three stages. Finding that migrants consume fewer cal-
ories than otherwise-similar locals provides the first hint that households are will-
ing to forgo calories to accommodate their cultural preferences. The first stage of 
the analysis presents this finding: migrant households consume fewer calories per 
person compared to nonmigrant households in the same village (conditioning on 
household food expenditures, characteristics, and demographics in a flexible man-
ner). The average level of this “caloric tax” (the percentage gap in caloric intake 
between locals and migrants) is equal to 1.6 percent of caloric intake. Reassuringly, 
I find a similar caloric tax when I compare households where the wife migrated 
across a state boundary at the time of marriage to households where the wife also 
moved villages at the time of marriage but stayed within her own state (a compari-
son in which the two sets of households appear very similar in terms of observables 
and hence are likely to be similar in terms of unobservables as well). I also find no 
evidence that the caloric tax is restricted to well-nourished households for whom 
reductions in caloric intake may have no nutritional consequences.
Of course, migrants may consume fewer calories per rupee of food expenditure 
for reasons unrelated to their food cultures. And the small magnitudes do not imply 
that cultural preferences for food can only have limited impacts: the caloric tax aver-
ages over two types of migrant; those whose preferences are well-suited to the local 
price-vector and enjoy a caloric dividend, and those whose preferences are unsuited 
and pay a substantial caloric tax. The second stage of the analysis addresses both 
these issues.
In the second stage, I form a chain of evidence showing that migrants are making 
calorically suboptimal food choices due to cultural preferences for the traditional 
foods of their origin states. First, I focus on the preferences themselves. I document 
that migrants bring their origin-state food preferences with them. In particular, I 
show that compared to other households in the same village or even other migrant 
households in the same village hailing from different states, the food-budget shares 
of a migrant household are more-closely correlated with the average food-budget 
shares of their origin state. Furthermore, these preferences for the foods of their 
origin state are more pronounced when both husband and wife are migrants (as 
opposed to just one of these two being migrants). Second, I combine these prefer-
ence results with caloric tax results of the second stage. I show that the heterogene-
ity in the size of the migrant caloric tax is related to the suitability and intensity of 
their origin-state food preferences: the caloric tax is only present when the average 
bundle of the migrant’s origin state provides fewer calories than the local bundle 
(both priced at the village price vector), and increases in size when both husband 
and wife are migrants.
In terms of magnitudes, the migrant households whose cultural preferences put 
them at the biggest disadvantage (i.e., both husband and wife migrated to a  village 
where the typical origin-state bundle provides fewer calories per rupee than the local 
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bundle) face a caloric tax of 7.2 percent. The caloric tax for this group remains a sub-
stantial 5.3 percent when I restrict my analysis to undernourished households. These 
are substantial magnitudes. For example, extrapolating from Schofield’s (2014) esti-
mates of the productivity decline among Indian farmers due to caloric reductions 
among Muslims during Ramadan, the caloric tax for these migrant groups would 
reduce agricultural productivity by between 4 and 10 percent.
Finally, the third stage of the analysis rules out two alternative explanations. 
Migrants may simply have poor information about the local alternatives to their 
origin-state foods. Alternatively, migrants may not possess the technologies, such 
as cooking equipment or recipes, needed to make high-quality meals from the 
locally-cheap foods. Both these explanations generate a link between the size of 
the caloric tax and the typical bundle of the migrant’s origin state but without 
migrants having different cultural preferences. Under these alternative explana-
tions, the caloric tax should not persist many years after migration or be present if 
other household members are familiar with the local foods. I find no evidence for 
either hypothesis. Finally, since women are typically in charge of food purchas-
ing and preparation in Indian households, the tax should be smaller when only 
the husband is a migrant compared to when only the wife is a migrant. In fact, I 
find the opposite result, consistent with migrants bringing their origin-state pref-
erences with them and husbands having greater bargaining power in household 
decision-making.
This set of results suggests that migrants in India consume fewer calories than 
nonmigrants because they prefer to purchase the traditional products from their ori-
gin state even when these products are relatively expensive compared to local alter-
natives. The finding that culture can have economically significant costs is likely to 
be true in many other contexts. However, there are also scenarios where culture can 
have positive effects on nutrition—an effect I find for the subset of migrants with 
preferences particularly well-suited to the local price vector.2 And, of course, the 
magnitudes I find are specific to the context of migrants within India (and poten-
tially a lower bound if migrants are more adaptable).
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, it adds to the growing literature 
on the importance of culture, a topic surveyed in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2006); Fernández (2011); and Alesina and Giuliano (2015). In using the behavior 
of migrants to examine the influence of culture on household decisions, it is particu-
larly closely related to Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee’s (1994) study of savings behavior; 
Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti’s (2004) and Fernández and Fogli’s (2009) studies 
of female labor force participation; and Giuliano’s (2007) study of family living 
arrangements. In contrast to this strand of the literature, which typically demon-
strates that culture can influence behavior, my approach allows me to quantify the 
costs that culture can impose.3
2 For example, in the context of the United States where over-consumption of calories is the problem, recent 
immigrants have lower levels of obesity than locals (Goel et al. 2004). The same is not true for US-born children 
of immigrants, in part because they adopt less-healthy American foods to fit in (Guendelman, Cheryan, and Monin 
2011). 
3 In this sense, the paper has similarities with Almond and Mazumder (2011) and Schofield (2014) which quan-
tify the health and productivity impacts of fasting for the Muslim holiday of Ramadan. 
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Second, I add to the literature on the persistence of food preferences initiated 
by Staehle (1934), with recent contributions by Logan and Rhode (2010) and 
Bronnenberg, Dube, and Gentzkow (2012). Although these papers document that 
migrants bring their food preferences with them (and in the latter case, the con-
sequences for brands’ market shares) none of these papers explore the nutritional 
consequences and hence the costs of such preferences. Finally, this study is related 
to Nunn and Qian (2011). Their finding, that over hundreds of years the Old World 
adopted New World crops with consequent nutritional improvements, suggests that 
the persistent food culture I find may weaken over many generations.
Atkin (2013) provides theoretical and empirical evidence for the existence of 
regional food preferences in India. The two papers differ in that Atkin (2013) lays 
out a model in which the combination of agroclimatic endowments and habits gen-
erate regional food tastes that favor the locally-abundant foods and explores the 
implications of this correlation between preferences and endowments for the size 
of the gains generated by trade. In contrast, this paper takes India’s regional food 
preferences as given, interprets these as cultural phenomena, and furthers our under-
standing of the importance of culture by quantifying the calories households are 
willing to forgo to accommodate their cultural preferences.
I lay out the paper as follows. Section I introduces the data and provides back-
ground on nutrition and cultural food preferences in India. Section II explains how 
I use migrants to identify the caloric costs of culture. Sections III and IV show that 
migrant households consume fewer calories than comparable nonmigrant house-
holds and that this finding is driven by migrants making calorically suboptimal food 
choices in order to accommodate their origin-state food preferences. Section V rules 
out the two noncultural explanations. Finally, Section VI discusses policy implica-
tions and concludes.
I. Data and Background on Malnutrition and Cultural Preferences  
for Food in India
A. Data Description
My analysis draws on two cross sections of the NSS collected by the National 
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO): the thirty-eighth round (1983) and the 
 forty-third round (1987–1988). As mentioned in the introduction, these are the only 
2 rounds of publicly available surveys in which the same household is asked both 
about their consumption of a broad set of foods as well as about their migration 
particulars.
Each survey round contains approximately 80,000 rural households (located in 
8,000 villages) and 45,000 urban households (located in 4,500 urban blocks). To 
simplify the exposition, I will use the word village to refer to the lowest geographic 
identifier (a village in a rural area but actually a block in an urban area). I stack the 
two cross-sections and create a combined dataset containing 240,040 households. 
Throughout the paper, I use the provided survey weights to make the sample nation-
ally representative.
The surveys record household expenditures and quantities for each food item 
consumed in the last 30 days (with homegrown foods and gifts both valued at the 
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prevailing local prices).4 There are 169 different food items, including 12 products 
made from rice or wheat, 9 types of pulse, 7 milk products, and many vegetables, 
spices, and meats. I obtain calorie data for each household by multiplying each 
food’s caloric content (using the calorie per unit quantity estimates contained in 
the NSSO reports that accompany each survey round) by the quantity consumed 
over the previous 30 days. I use this number to calculate the daily caloric intake per 
household member.5 The surveys also provide information on expenditures on non-
food items as well as household demographics and characteristics.
Turning to migration particulars, by design the survey only records permanent 
migrations (as opposed to temporary migrations for seasonal work opportunities). 
The survey asks whether the enumeration village differs from the household mem-
ber’s “last usual residence.” If so, the household member is asked the reason for 
migration, how long ago they migrated and the state in which their last usual resi-
dence was located. (Hence, for households that migrated multiple times, the state 
of their last residence may not coincide with their regional preferences, a measure-
ment issue which will tend to attenuate my results.) I define interstate migrants as 
households in which either the household head or their spouse moved between one 
of the 31 states in India. Except where noted otherwise, I use the household head’s 
migration information if both head and spouse emigrated. Since the household head 
is male and the spouse is female in 99.7 percent of cases, I use the terms household 
head and husband interchangeably, and similarly the terms spouse and wife.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the dataset. About 6.1 percent of house-
holds are classified as migrant households. Most of these households are  long-term 
migrants, with 41.3 percent having migrated 20 or more years ago and only 
15.2 percent having migrated less than 5 years ago. In terms of household structure, 
in 41.3 percent of cases only the wife is a migrant (consistent with Indian “patrilo-
cality” norms that I exploit later whereby, particularly in North India, wives move in 
with their husband’s family upon marriage). In a further 32.5 percent of cases, both 
the husband and wife are migrants from the same origin state, and in only 13.2 per-
cent of cases is the husband the sole migrant.
B. Malnutrition in India
Indian households in 1983 and 1987–1988 consume a small number of calories. 
The mean caloric intake is 2,224 per person per day across the 2 samples. To get 
a sense of magnitudes, recent figures (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 2008) were 3,750 calories per person per day for the United States, 
2,990 for China, and 2,360 for India.
India drew the poverty line it still uses today based on the calorie norms required 
for a nutritionally adequate diet. These norms were set at 2,400 calories per person 
4 The survey records expenditures of consumed foods and so includes any foods or meals purchased nonlocally 
if away from home or foods purchased in other periods with expenditures costed at the actual purchase price. 
5 These numbers likely overestimate actual caloric intake. Some of these calories are fed to servants, pets, and 
guests; or are wasted (due to spoilage or simply thrown away). Online Appendix Table C2 shows meals served and 
meals eaten out are similar for migrant and nonmigrant households. If wastage rates are higher for migrants as they 
are less familiar with local foods, my later estimates underestimate the difference in caloric intake between migrants 
and nonmigrants. Actual caloric absorption will be even lower if household members have ailments such as diarrhea 
that prevent the body from fully absorbing the calories. 
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per day for rural India and 2,100 calories per person per day for urban India. Using 
this simple indicator of household nutrition, 66.4 percent of rural households and 
59.6 percent of urban households in my sample are undernourished. Many house-
holds lie substantially below these levels with 50.3 percent of households more than 
250 calories per person per day below these norms and 34.1 percent more than 
500 calories below these norms.6
While there is an imperfect mapping between my measure of caloric intake and 
malnutrition, these low levels of caloric intake are consistent with the extremely 
high child-malnutrition rates in India. The first wave of the National Family Health 
Survey was administered in 1992–1993. The survey measured and weighed around 
35,000 children under age 4 and found that 53.4 percent were moderately to severely 
underweight, and 52.0 percent were moderately to severely stunted. These numbers 
imply a higher prevalence of under nutrition than in sub-Saharan Africa (Deaton and 
Drèze 2009), and suggest that a substantial number of Indian households were living 
on the edge of malnutrition at the time of the surveys.
6 Table 1 provides further details and online Appendix Figure A2 shows the full distribution of caloric intake. 
Table 1—Sample Descriptive Statistics
 














Full sample 240,040 1.000 0.778 0.0608 0.459










Migrant breakdown by within-household migrant structure
Full sample 0.112 0.413 0.132 0.324 0.019
Wife moved for marriage sample 0.000 0.807 0.000 0.173 0.020
0 to 4 years 5 to 9 years 10 to 20 years
20 or  
more years
Migrant breakdown by years since migration (most recent migrant in household)
Full sample 0.152 0.141 0.293 0.413






















of per capita 
expenditure
Migrant breakdown by per capita expenditure and nutrition
Full sample 0.649 0.503 0.341 0.502 0.251
Wife moved for marriage sample 0.652 0.503 0.337 0.529 0.267
Notes: Table shows the proportion of the sample households in various categories. All proportions use the house-
hold weights provided by the NSS.
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C. Cultural Preferences for Food in India
It will be important for my analysis that there are many different food cultures 
within India, and that these food cultures differ across states. The field of nutritional 
anthropology has identified many different food cultures across religious, caste, and 
ethnolinguistic groups within India. For example, unlike Muslims and low-caste 
Hindus, high-caste Hindus are typically vegetarian but adherence varies dramati-
cally by region. In online Appendix A, I review this literature and provide examples 
of these different food cultures.
The regional taste differences these food cultures generate fit squarely within the 
definitions of culture used in the economics literature. Fernández (2011, p. 484) 
defines differences in culture as “systematic variation in beliefs and preferences 
across time, space or social groups.” The variation in food preferences across states 
of India fits this definition since state boundaries were drawn primarily along major 
ethnolinguistic divisions. Furthermore, India’s religious minorities are often con-
centrated in particular states. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006, p. 23) define cul-
ture as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups 
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation.” Since adult food prefer-
ences are determined in part by the foods consumed in childhood, and adults choose 
which foods are fed to their children, the variation in food preferences across states 
of India also fits this second definition of culture.7 Accordingly, this paper treats 
regional and cultural food preferences as synonymous.
Online Appendix A also explores one particularly important example—regional 
preferences for rice and wheat. Despite these two cereals providing a similar num-
ber of calories and micro-nutrients per rupee, there is dramatic regional variation 
in consumption. For example, the relative price of rice and wheat is similar in the 
states of Kerala and Punjab, yet Keralites consumed 13 times more rice than wheat 
and Punjabis 10 times more wheat than rice. Atkin (2013) shows how  agroclimatic 
endowments coupled with habit formation can generate these different food cul-
tures. In terms of the costs of these cultural preferences, a crude counterfactual 
shows that mean Indian caloric intake could be 6.1 percent higher if households in 
rice-loving states switched the quantity of rice and wheat that they were consuming 
(and vice versa for wheat-loving states). However, since every village has a different 
price vector, complex substitution patterns may rationalize this consumption behav-
ior, necessitating the methodology I propose below.
II. Empirical Methodology: Examining the Behavior of Migrants
The behavior of interstate migrants provides more convincing evidence that 
culture can constrain caloric intake. I break the analysis into two sections. In 
Section III, I show that the average migrant consumes fewer calories per rupee than 
the  nonmigrants around them. Then in Section IV, I link the size of this caloric 
tax to cultural preferences for the traditional foods of the migrants’ origin states. 
For the first result to be interpreted as preference-driven, I require that migrants 
7 Birch (1999) surveys the evidence from the psychology and nutrition literature which finds that adult food 
preferences form in part through consumption in childhood. 
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and  nonmigrants living in the same geographic location face the same prices and 
external environment, have the same desire for good nutrition and dietary variety, 
and differ only in their food preferences (after controlling for various household 
expenditure measures, household demographics, and observable household charac-
teristics). In the following paragraphs, I argue that these assumptions are likely to 
be satisfied. For the second result, I am essentially comparing migrants to each other 
(by showing that the caloric tax only appears for migrants whose origin-state bundle 
is unsuited to the local price vector), and in fact replicate the analysis focusing only 
on migrants. Therefore, even if migrants and nonmigrants do differ on unobserv-
ables, in order to explain both results any differences would have to be systemati-
cally correlated with the composition of the average food bundle consumed in the 
migrants’ origin state.
The first reason why the assumptions above are tenable is that the NSS data allow 
me to make this comparison at an extremely disaggregated geographic level. In each 
survey round the NSSO draws a sample of around 8,000 rural villages and 4,500 
urban blocks and surveys 10 households in each village/block. Any village/block 
with more than 1,200 inhabitants (approximately 180 households) is subdivided 
into smaller geographical subgroups, and only 1 subgroup is surveyed. Therefore, I 
can compare migrant and nonmigrant households that live in very close proximity 
and so are likely to shop at the same stores, particularly in rural areas where there 
may only be one store in the village, and face similar external environments.
Second, Indian migration patterns are not concentrated along only a few specific 
routes. If this were the case, the assumption that migrants and nonmigrants have 
the same desire for nutrition and dietary variety may be violated. For example, sup-
pose most migrants come from Kerala and Keralites particularly value nutrition. In 
this scenario, if migrants (i.e., Keralites) consume fewer calories than locals (i.e., 
non-Keralites) I cannot infer they also consume fewer nutrients. Such a concern is 
mitigated if migrants come from many origin states (decreasing the likelihood that 
all migrants place a high value on nutrition or variety) and if migrants move in both 
directions between states (and so migrants and nonmigrants place an equal value on 
nutrition or variety). Online Appendix Table C1 displays the proportion of migrants 
that moved between particular origin and destination states. Unsurprisingly, the 
larger states in India are either the source or destination of most migrant flows. 
However, routes are dispersed with migrants moving from many different states and 
often in both directions, mitigating the above concern.
Third, migrants do face the same prices as nonmigrants, at least after controlling 
for observable characteristics. Table 2 compares both household characteristics and 
prices paid across migrant and nonmigrant households within the same village. The 
characteristics I focus on are the set of controls used by Subramanian and Deaton 
(1996) to estimate Indian caloric elasticities. I regress each characteristic on a vil-
lage fixed effect and a migrant-household dummy and report the coefficient on the 
dummy. Compared to other households in their village, migrant households have 
6.2 percent higher per capita expenditures, 4.5 percent higher per capita food expen-
diture, and consume 1.3 percent more calories per person.8
8 Migrant households are also slightly smaller, contain a larger proportion of prime-age males, are less likely to 
be categorized as agricultural labor, and are more likely to be categorized as urban self-employed. 
1153Atkin: the CAloriC Costs of CultureVol. 106 no. 4
The last three rows test the assumption that migrants face the same prices as 
nonmigrants. I calculate household-level prices by dividing household expenditure 
on a food by the calories purchased. The first row shows the migrant-dummy coef-
ficient when the log price per calorie is regressed on a product-village fixed effect 
and a migrant dummy. The second row shows the same coefficient but the regres-
sion now includes expenditure controls in the shape of a round-specific cubic in 
log household food expenditure per capita. The third row also includes household 
characteristic controls. Migrants pay 0.3 percent more than nonmigrant households 
in the same village buying the same product. However, this difference is due to 
migrants being wealthier than nonmigrants—and presumably buying higher  quality 







(wife moved for 
marriage sample)
(1) (2) (3)
log caloric intake per person per day 7.6286 0.0133*** 0.0034
(0.3712) (0.0049) (0.0080)
log household per capita expenditure 4.8272 0.0624*** 0.0423***
 (rupees, 30 days) (0.5816) (0.0069) (0.0108)
log food expenditure 4.4205 0.0460*** 0.0272***
 (rupees, 30 days) (0.5045) (0.0059) (0.0094)
log household size 1.7522 −0.0314*** 0.0001
(0.4848) (0.0068) (0.0104)
Proportion males 0–4 0.0677 0.0025 0.0034
(0.1043) (0.0015) (0.0026)
Proportion females 0–4 0.0634 0.0021 0.0044*
(0.1020) (0.0014) (0.0024)
Proportion males 5–9 0.0722 −0.0007 −0.0023
(0.1055) (0.0014) (0.0024)
Proportion females 5–9 0.0656 −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.1004) (0.0015) (0.0025)
Proportion males 10–14 0.0666 −0.0007 −0.0030
(0.1052) (0.0014) (0.0024)
Proportion females 10–14 0.0575 −0.0006 −0.0027
(0.0962) (0.0013) (0.0022)
Proportion males 15–55 0.2701 0.0113*** 0.0023
(0.1596) (0.0023) (0.0030)
Proportion females 15–55 0.2625 −0.0089*** −0.0016
(0.1339) (0.0017) (0.0026)
Proportion males over 55 0.0375 −0.0013 −0.0007
(0.0875) (0.0011) (0.0017)
Proportion females over 55 0.0370 −0.0036*** 0.0005
(0.0917) (0.0010) (0.0016)
Rural self-employed in non-agriculture 0.0972 0.0036 0.0041
(0.2963) (0.0038) (0.0068)
Urban self-employed 0.0853 0.0212*** 0.0158***
(0.2793) (0.0043) (0.0060)
Rural agricultural labor 0.2151 −0.0110** −0.0160*
(0.4109) (0.0044) (0.0085)
Urban wage earner 0.0513 −0.0054* −0.0022
(0.2207) (0.0031) (0.0042)
(Continued )
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 products—since it becomes small and insignificant once I control for household 
food expenditure in rows two and three. Therefore, in order to ensure that migrants 
and nonmigrants in the same village are paying the same prices, all my specifica-
tions include a full set of controls for expenditure and household characteristics.
After controlling for observables, migrant and nonmigrant households may still 
differ on unobservables. As an important robustness check, I draw on an alternative 
sample in which migrant and nonmigrant households appear far more similar along 
observable dimensions, and hence are likely to be more similar along unobservable 
dimensions. This sample also mitigates the potential selection problems that arise 
when household heads are choosing to migrate for better employment opportunities 
or because they are particularly adaptable to different cultures.9
I take advantage of the fact that a substantial proportion of migration in India 
is driven by women moving to their husband’s village at the time of marriage 
9 To produce my findings, migrants need to consume higher price per calorie foods than nonmigrants with sim-
ilar incomes for reasons unrelated to their origin-state tastes. The bias works in the other direction if migrants are 
more likely to be manual laborers consuming diets heavy in cheap carbohydrates or have unusually adaptable tastes. 







(wife moved for 
marriage sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Rural other labor 0.0553 0.0069** −0.0006
(0.2286) (0.0028) (0.0046)
Urban casual labor 0.0143 −0.0037** −0.0010
(0.1188) (0.0018) (0.0023)
Rural self-employed in agriculture 0.3464 −0.0075 −0.0016
(0.4758) (0.0049) (0.0097)
Rural other 0.0643 0.0080** 0.0141***
(0.2453) (0.0031) (0.0049)
Urban other 0.0707 −0.0120*** −0.0126***
(0.2564) (0.0033) (0.0046)
log price paid (no controls) 0.6458 0.00341*** −0.00033
 (rupees per 1,000 calories) (1.0874) (0.00115) (0.00204)
log price paid (food expenditure controls) 0.6451 0.00154 −0.00137
 (rupees per 1,000 calories) (1.0876) (0.00113) (0.00202)
log price paid (controls) 0.6447 0.00102 −0.00184
 (rupees per 1,000 calories) (1.0874) (0.00112) (0.00202)
Notes: Column 1 shows mean of each household-level variable in the row title. Column 2 shows coefficient on 
a migrant dummy when the variable is regressed on a village-round fixed effect and a migrant-status dummy. 
Column 3 shows coefficient for same regression but restricting attention to households in  the wife moved for mar-
riage sample described in text. Last three rows show coefficient on a migrant dummy from a regression of log unit 
values for every product purchased on product-village-round fixed effects and a migrant-status dummy. The con-
trols row includes the vector of controls for log per capita food expenditure and household characteristics used in 
later regressions, the food expenditure controls row just uses a cubic in log food expenditure per capita. Regressions 
weighted by household weights except the last three rows that use food-budget shares interacted with household 
weights to ensure that important foods are more influential and that the sum of weights for each household equals 
the NSS household weight. Regressions clustered at level of the fixed effects.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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(Srinivas 1980). This norm of “patrilocality” is so prevalent that 57 percent of 
wives report both that their current village is not their last usual residence and list 
the reason for leaving that location as “on marriage.”10 Most of these moves occur 
within the same state, with wives crossing a state border at the time of marriage 
in only 6  percent of cases. I exploit this variation by focusing only on households 
in which the wife moved for marriage, and comparing those in which the wife 
moved interstate (migrant households) to those in which the wife moved intrastate 
(nonmigrant households). In the spirit of the exercise, I also exclude households 
in which both husband and wife moved at the same time since these households 
may be moving for work opportunities.
Although a similar proportion of households are classified as migrants in both 
this wife moved for marriage sample and the main sample, Table 1 shows that 
migrants in the wife moved for marriage sample are more likely to live in rural areas 
(and hence appear more similar to the general population which is predominantly 
rural) and more likely to be long-term migrants. Table 2 confirms the conjecture 
that migrant and nonmigrant households appear more similar in the wife moved 
for marriage sample. Although migrant households still have higher expenditures 
than nonmigrants, the difference in expenditures declines by a third. Migrant house-
holds are no longer smaller, nor do they contain a larger proportion of prime-age 
males. Finally, migrants pay less, not more, than nonmigrants for the same prod-
uct, and these differences are minuscule and insignificant with or without controls. 
Therefore, I reproduce all my main findings using this wife moved for marriage 
sample in order to convince the reader that my results are not likely to be driven by 
unobservable differences between migrants and nonmigrants.
Inevitably, the methodology outlined in this section can only estimate the caloric 
tax that actual migrants pay. If potential migrants are aware of this cost of migration, 
actual migrants are likely to face smaller caloric taxes either because they avoid 
locations with particularly deleterious price vectors or because they possess particu-
larly open-minded or flexible preferences. Hence, the potential size of this tax may 
be much larger for households that choose not to migrate.
III. Migrants Consume Fewer Calories per Rupee than Nonmigrants
In this section, I present the first empirical result: that migrant households pay a 
“caloric tax.” In particular, I test the hypothesis that migrants consume fewer calo-
ries per rupee of food expenditure compared to the nonmigrant households living 
around them.
In order to test this hypothesis, I use the data on the consumption of all 169 foods 
to generate  ln calorie s i , the log of caloric intake per person per day, for every house-
hold (where  i indexes households). I regress this measure on  migran t i , a dummy 
variable for a migrant household, and  d vt , a village-round fixed effect (where  v 
denotes village or urban block and  t denotes the survey round). The village-round 
fixed effect is equivalent to a village fixed effect since villages are anonymized and 
10 In contrast, under 1 percent of male household heads moved location for the purpose of marriage. Among 
male movers, 48 percent cite employment reasons and 18 percent cite marriage (these figures are 2 and 85 percent 
for wives). 
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cannot be matched across the two survey rounds. Additionally, I include a vector 
of household-level controls,  X i , containing a third-order polynomial in the log of 
the per capita food expenditure over the previous 30 days, as well as a comprehen-
sive set of demographics and characteristics that follow the specification used by 
Subramanian and Deaton (1996):
(1)  ln calorie s i =  β 1 migran t i +  d vt +  Π t X i +  ε i . 
The hypothesis  β 1 < 0 tests whether migrants consume fewer calories than their 
neighbors in the same village, conditional on their food expenditure and other 
household-level controls. Given the inclusion of log food expenditure in the con-
trols, this test is exactly equivalent to asking if migrants obtain fewer calories per 
rupee of food expenditure than nonmigrants in their village, conditioning on food 
expenditure and other household-level controls.
The demographic and characteristic variables in  X i control for the possibility that, 
compared to other households in the village, migrants may work in less physically- 
intensive jobs or have different demographic structures. The controls for household 
demographics include log household size as well as the proportion of household 
members that fall into 5 sex-specific age brackets; 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–55, and over 
55. The controls for household characteristics are indicator variables for the house-
hold’s primary activity.11 I allow the coefficients on all my controls to differ by sur-
vey round. Subramanian and Deaton (1996) also include indicators for religion and 
caste. Since religious affiliation and caste membership may be cultural determinants 
of food preferences, I exclude these controls.
The error terms may be correlated across households within the same village 
and across households that share the same origin state. Therefore, both here and 
in the regressions that follow, I two-way cluster the standard errors at both the vil-
lage-round and origin-state level.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the results of this regression. I reject the null hypoth-
esis, that migrants consume an equal or greater number of calories per rupee than 
nonmigrants, (e.g.,  β 1 ≥ 0 ) at the 1 percent level: interstate migrant households 
are consuming 1.59 percent fewer calories than their nonmigrant neighbors, con-
trolling for food expenditure (with a 95 percent confidence interval between 0.95 
and 2.23 percent). In monetary terms, this caloric tax on migrants is commensurate 
with the caloric decline due to a 2.47 percent reduction in food expenditure for the 
average migrant household.
The magnitude of the caloric tax does not mean that cultural preferences for food 
can only have small impacts. First, the size of the caloric tax should depend on how 
costly it is for a migrant to accommodate their origin-state food preferences. If the 
origin-state preferences are well-suited to the local price-vector, migrants may actu-
ally consume more calories for a given level of food expenditure. The coefficient 
on  migran t i merely summarizes the average caloric tax faced by migrants traveling 
11 The categories are: rural self-employed in agriculture, rural self-employed in non-agriculture, rural agricul-
tural labor, rural other labor, rural other, urban self-employed, urban wage earner, urban casual labor, and urban 
other. 
1157Atkin: the CAloriC Costs of CultureVol. 106 no. 4
Table 3—Comparing the Caloric Intake of Migrants and Nonmigrants



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 migrant i −0.0159*** −0.00962*** −0.0121*** −0.0136*** −0.0117*** −0.0168***(0.00326) (0.00214) (0.00356) (0.00442) (0.00418) (0.00316)
Observations 235,126 226,584 91,406 235,104 235,122 235,126
Within R2 0.732 0.905 0.718 0.520 0.676 0.723
Food expenditure controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
Total expenditure controls No No No Yes No No
Real food expenditure controls No No No No Yes No
State-specific food expenditure controls No No No No No Yes
Demographics/household type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log caloric intake (per person per day)
Occupation, 
industry, PDS foods 


















at village  
median prices
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 migrant i −0.0135*** −0.0150*** −0.0118*** −0.0209*** −0.0145*** −0.0149***(0.00343) (0.00346) (0.00332) (0.00483) (0.00322) (0.00351)
Observations 230,027 231,281 234,961 235,068 235,104 235,104
Within R2 0.831 0.730 0.711 0.729 0.325 0.306
Food expenditure controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Total expenditure controls No No No No Yes Yes
Real food expenditure controls No No No No No No
State-specific food expenditure controls No No No No No No
Demographics/household type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable for columns 1–10 is log caloric intake per person per day. Dependent variable for col-
umn 11 is log caloric intake per rupee of actual food expenditure and for column 12 is log caloric intake per rupee of 
food expenditure where calories are priced at the village median price for each food. Independent variable  migran t i 
is a dummy for whether the household head or their spouse is an interstate migrant. All specifications include vil-
lage-round fixed effects and flexible survey-round-specific controls for household size, demographics, and type as 
well as a third-order polynomial in log per capita food expenditure (bar columns 4 to 6 and columns 11 to 12 which 
use alternate expenditure controls detailed in column headers, where the food expenditure controls in column 5 are 
deflated by a state-specific Stone price index: the sum of log prices weighted by state budget shares). Column 2 
restricts attention to calories from rice and wheat products only. Column 3 restricts attention to households in which 
the wife of the household head moved village at the time of marriage and compares wives who moved interstate 
(migrants) to those who moved intrastate (nonmigrants). Columns 7 and 8 include round dummies interacted with 
controls for the occupation of the household head (643 categories), industry of head (526 categories), the ratio of 
meals served to guests and employees to those consumed by household members at home, and the ratio of meals 
consumed by household members outside the house to those consumed inside the house. Column 9 instruments 
the polynomial in total food expenditure with a polynomial in total non-food expenditure. Column 10 excludes 
the foods commonly sold through the Public Distribution System. All regressions are weighted using household 
weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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along a multitude of routes and facing positive and negative caloric taxes.12 Second, 
recall that for many of these households only one member of the household (usually 
the wife) migrated from another state. Any effects are likely to be more exaggerated 
if both husband and wife are migrants since a greater proportion of household deci-
sion-makers possess non-local preferences. In Section IVC and IVD, I explore both 
these dimensions of heterogeneity and find substantially higher caloric taxes for the 
most adversely affected migrant groups.
A. Robustness Checks
The remaining columns of Table 3 report a variety of robustness checks. 
Reductions in caloric intake may not lower nutrition if households substitute 
calorie-rich foods for protein- or vitamin-rich foods. As discussed in Section II, 
the diversity of migration patterns give us no reason to think migrants substitute 
between the components of a nutritious diet differently than observationally-equiv-
alent nonmigrants facing the same prices. Thus, the smaller number of calories per 
rupee that migrants consume likely implies lower levels of nutrition. To buttress this 
claim, column 2 restricts attention to caloric intake from rice and wheat products 
that together account for 65.5 percent of total caloric consumption. The migrant 
caloric tax falls to 0.96 percent but remains significant. As rice and wheat have 
very similar nutritional profiles, fewer calories from rice and wheat almost certainly 
correspond to less nutrition from the two foods.13 Furthermore, Section IIIB shows 
similar reductions in protein as well as other nutrition metrics.
Column 3 runs the regression on the wife moved for marriage sample for which 
unobservable differences between migrant and nonmigrant households were less of 
a concern. I compare households where wives moved intrastate at the time of mar-
riage (a nonmigrant) with those where the wife moved interstate (a migrant). The 
caloric tax on migrants is still significantly negative for this sample but is attenuated 
by 24 percent.14 The decline in the coefficient size is not surprising. Wives typically 
move into their husband’s household (often containing extended family members 
such as the husband’s parents). Any cultural preferences brought by the wife are 
likely to have smaller impacts on household spending decisions compared to the sce-
nario where both husband and wife are migrants (a hypothesis I test in Section IV).
Columns 4 to 6 use alternative expenditure controls in place of the polynomial 
in log per capita food expenditure. Column 4 uses a third-order polynomial in log 
per capita expenditure on all goods. I find a caloric tax of 1.36 percent. Since the 
coefficients are of similar magnitude when I control for either food expenditure or 
total expenditure, migrants are not simply substituting from non-food to food to 
accommodate their food preferences. Results are similar in column 5, which uses a 
12 The average caloric tax faced by migrants will be negative if local preferences adapt through the process of 
habit formation to favor whichever foods are locally inexpensive as in Atkin (2013). 
13 Of course migrants may compensate by purchasing more nutritious foods in other categories or spending 
more on rice and wheat. However, both of these solutions come at a cost which this paper seeks to quantify. 
14 I would also find  β 1 < 0 if wives from further away are more valued and fed higher quality foods; or if wives 
choose cheaper calorie sources than others in the household and wives from further away control a smaller share 
of household budgets. 
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polynomial in log per capita real food expenditure, and column 6, which allows the 
food expenditure elasticities to vary by state.
My measure of caloric intake may be misleading if migrants work in jobs that 
require less energy, eat out more, or serve a greater share of food purchases to 
non-household members. In column 7, I include finer controls for the occupation 
(643 categories) and industry (526 categories) of the household head, as well as for 
the number of meals consumed by household members away from home and served 
to employees and guests (both as ratios of the number of meals consumed at home 
by household members). The caloric tax declines slightly to 1.35 percent, predomi-
nantly due to the thousands of industry-occupation controls (column 8 includes only 
meal controls and finds a tax of 1.50 percent and online Appendix Table C2 shows 
that migrants do not differ in terms of meals out or meals served to others).
Column 9 of Table 3 instruments the food expenditure polynomial with a poly-
nomial in non-food expenditure to mitigate correlated measurement error concerns 
(since both calories and food expenditure are calculated from the same raw data).15 
Food expenditure may also be endogenous. A shock that increases the demand for 
calories, such as changing work patterns, will also increase food expenditure, bias-
ing the coefficients on food expenditure upwards. However, there will be a nega-
tive or no correlation with non-food expenditure so the true value of  β 1 will very 
likely be bounded between the instrumented and uninstrumented estimates. (Online 
Appendix B formalizes this claim.) Since the estimated  β 1 is only attenuated by a 
quarter and is still significantly negative in the instrumental variable specification, 
neither measurement error nor the endogeneity of food expenditure seem to be prob-
lematic in this context.
Finally, I return to the concern that migrants and nonmigrants pay different prices 
(recall from Table 2 that, although insignificant, migrants paid slightly higher prices). 
This concern is most severe for the three foods (rice, wheat, and sugar) that are com-
monly sold through the subsidized Public Distribution System (PDS).16 Although 
the system was not restricted to poor households until the 1990s, migrants may 
still have had worse access to this system and hence paid higher prices. Column 10 
reproduces my main specification excluding these three food groups. Reassuringly, 
I find a larger caloric tax of 2.09 percent when I exclude these PDS foods. 
Columns 11 and 12 take a different approach. Column 11 replaces  ln calorie s i with 
 ln calories_ per_Rupe e i , the calories per rupee spent on food, and includes controls 
for per capita expenditure (recall that the coefficient on  migran t i would be identical to 
column 1 if per capita food expenditure controls were included instead). Column 12 
uses the same specification but calculates  ln calories_ per_Rupe e i by pricing each 
food at the village median price for that food. I find that migrants obtain 1.45 per-
cent fewer calories per rupee of food expenditure than their nonmigrant neighbors, 
conditioning on total expenditure, and this caloric tax is essentially unchanged at 
1.49 percent when I price each food at the village median price. Therefore, migrants 
15 The higher-order non-food expenditure terms are weak predictors of higher-order food expenditure and so 
there are weak instruments concerns. If I use just first order terms instead, the Angrist-Pischke F-statistics are 1,821 
for round 38 and 606 for round 43, and the coefficient on the migrant dummy is essentially unchanged (rising 
slightly from 0.118 to 0.120). 
16 If I reproduce the price regressions just for foods in these three groups, migrants pay (an insignificant) 0.24 
percent more for these foods than nonmigrants in the same village after conditioning on the full set of controls. 
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 consume fewer calories than locals through purchasing different consumption bun-
dles rather than through paying different prices.
Online Appendix Table C3 allows the caloric tax to differ by survey round, by 
whether the migrant’s origin and destination were rural or urban, and by whether 
the migrant’s origin and destination states were rice or wheat dominated. Results 
are similar across rounds, but the migrant caloric tax is substantially smaller for 
migrants moving from rural areas or from wheat to rice states. In Section IVC, I 
return to this heterogeneity when I explore how the caloric tax varies by migration 
route.
B. Migrants Consume Fewer Calories Even When on the Edge of Malnutrition
Migrants may be willing to accommodate their cultural preferences but only if 
they are sufficiently rich and well-nourished that any foregone calories are irrelevant 
(and may even be beneficial). Accordingly, Table 4 repeats the basic specification 
for various sub-populations that are poor and under-nourished, and also explores 
several alternative nutrition metrics.
Column 1 repeats the baseline specification. Columns 2 to 4 restrict attention 
to undernourished households (those consuming fewer calories than the 2,400 
rural/2,100 urban calorie norms, or those either 250 or 500 calories per person per 
day below the norms). Columns 5 to 8 restrict attention to poorer households (those 
spending less than either the median or twenty-fifth percentile of either per capita 
expenditure or per capita food expenditure in that round). Although the size of the 
caloric tax paid by migrants is slightly smaller for these seven subpopulations, it still 
lies between 1.0 and 1.7 percent.17
Adequate nutrition is particularly important for households with young children 
as shortfalls at young ages have substantial scarring effects on productivity, earn-
ings, and health in adulthood (Almond and Currie 2010). Columns 9 to 12 restrict 
attention to families with children below the age of either 5 or 16, and then further 
restricting attention to households spending less than the median level of per capita 
food expenditure. Even in these subpopulations, I find a significant caloric tax, with 
magnitudes ranging between 1.3 and 1.7 percent. Given that India’s child malnutri-
tion rates were in excess of 50 percent around this time period, these poor house-
holds with children are very likely to be on the edge of malnutrition.
Columns 17 to 32 of Table 4 replace log caloric intake with other nutritional met-
rics. To explore where in the distribution the migrant caloric tax hits I consider the 
“caloric shortfall,” the number of calories a household consumes below the 2,400 
rural/2,100 urban calorie norms. As shown in columns 17 to 20, the shortfall is sig-
nificantly greater for migrant households, and migrants are 1.4 percent more likely 
to be 250 calories and 1.5 percent more likely to be 500 calories (per person per 
day) below the calorie norms. Columns 21 to 28 repeat this exercise for households 
with children under 5 and under 16, and draw similar conclusions (although when I 
halve the sample by only considering households with children under 5, the binary 
17 The coefficients are all significantly negative except when considering the bottom expenditure quartiles where 
the sample size is much smaller and the standard errors much higher (rather than the effect size being much lower). 
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measures become marginally insignificant). As above, it is not only well nourished 
households who pay the caloric tax.
I also consider several alternative nutrition metrics. Columns 29 and 30 consider 
protein and fat intake, respectively. Migrant households consume significantly less 
Table 4—Comparing the Caloric Intake of Migrants and Nonmigrants:  
Subpopulations and Alternative Nutrition Measures




























(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)
 migrant i −0.0159*** −0.0158*** −0.0122*** −0.0134** −0.0107** −0.0141 −0.0147** −0.00981(0.00326) (0.00414) (0.00448) (0.00577) (0.00471) (0.00865) (0.00581) (0.00703)
Observations 235,126 131,149 96,169 59,588 87,010 36,436 86,531 36,921
Within R2 0.732 0.640 0.627 0.622 0.674 0.689 0.643 0.633
Food expenditure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 controls
Demographics/house- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 hold type controls
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes
log caloric intake (per person per day)
Sample:
Children 

















5 or more 
years ago
Migrated 
10 or more 
years ago
Migrated  
20 or more 
years ago Literate
(9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16)
 migrant i −0.0132*** −0.0141** −0.0169***−0.0140*** −0.0114***−0.00650** 0.00183 −0.0171***(0.00461) (0.00715) (0.00330) (0.00533) (0.00335) (0.00323) (0.00421) (0.00401)
Observations 103,652 47,881 178,456 75,644 231,268 228,442 223,489 128,706
Within R2 0.700 0.630 0.713 0.637 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732
Food expenditure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 controls
Demographics/house- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 hold type controls
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes




























(17) (18) (19) (20)   (21) (22) (23) (24)
 migrant i 14.21*** 0.00330 0.0137** 0.0149** 13.40** −0.00109 0.0122 0.0115(4.515) (0.00417) (0.00606) (0.00608) (6.209) (0.00651) (0.00808) (0.00792)
Observations 235,126 235,126 235,126 235,126 103,652 103,652 103,652 103,652
Within R2 0.633 0.397 0.401 0.377 0.626 0.346 0.363 0.356
Food expenditure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 controls
Demographics/house- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 hold type controls
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Continued )
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protein, an essential component of nutrition, than nonmigrant households but there 
is little difference in fat consumption. Column 31 explores the number of meals 
consumed per day by each household member, while column 32 explores the binary 
response to the survey question “Do all members of your household get two square 
meals a day?” asked in round 38. As discussed by Deaton and Drèze (2009), caloric 
shortfalls and skipping meals are not the same thing and are uncorrelated in the 
Indian NSS data. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that I do not find significant 
differences between migrant and nonmigrant households along these dimensions 
(although, as discussed in Section IVC, significant and borderline significant rela-
tionships appear for migrants moving to locations where relative prices are unsuited 
to their origin-state preferences).
Online Appendix Table C4 presents supportive results using another dataset, the 
2005 and 2011 rounds of the India Human Development Survey (Desai et al. 2005, 
2011), that contains anthropometric data. Households are asked if they migrated 
from another state, although not which state that was, which precludes using these 
data in the later analysis. I repeat the basic specification but replacing log calories 
with either child weight-for-age or child height-for-age Z-scores (both calculated 
using the 2006 WHO child growth standards for children aged 0 to 5). I find that 
migrant children weigh 0.220 standard deviations less and are 0.222 standard devia-
tions smaller than nonmigrant children in their same village (significant at the 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively, with further details and specifications for older ages 
provided in the table).
Table 4—Comparing the Caloric Intake of Migrants and Nonmigrants:  
Subpopulations and Alternative Nutrition Measures (Continued  )
































meals a day 
(binary)
(25) (26) (27) (28)   (29) (30) (31)   (32)
 migrant i 14.49*** 0.00461 0.0126* 0.0135** −0.0160*** −0.000544 −0.000915 0.000227(4.502) (0.00537) (0.00667) (0.00615) (0.00365) (0.00352) (0.00208) (0.00431)
Observations 178,456 178,456 178,456 178,456 235,124 235,121 234,838 109,672
Within R2 0.628 0.367 0.379 0.365 0.682 0.746 0.043   0.162
Food expenditure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 controls
Demographics/house- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 hold type controls
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes
Notes: Dependent variable for columns 1–16 is log caloric intake per person per day. Dependent variable for col-
umns 17–32 is detailed in column heading and described in Section IIIB. Independent variable  migran t i is a dummy 
for whether the household head or their spouse is an interstate migrant. All specifications include village-round 
fixed effects and flexible survey-round-specific controls for household size, demographics, and type as well as a 
third-order polynomial in log per capita food expenditure. The column headings on columns 1–16 and the subhead-
ings in columns 17–32 denote the various subpopulations on which the regressions are run. Caloric shortfall defined 
relative to the 2,400 calorie urban/2,100 rural calorie norms. All regressions are weighted using household weights 
and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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In summary, migrant households consume fewer calories per rupee of food 
expenditure than nonmigrant households, even when on the edge of malnutrition.
IV. Why Do Migrants Consume Fewer Calories than Nonmigrants?
In this section, I form a chain of evidence in support of an explanation for the 
previous findings based on culture: that migrants make calorically suboptimal food 
choices due to strong preferences for the favored foods of their origin states. First, I 
focus on the preferences themselves. In Section IVA and IVB, I show that migrants 
bring their origin-state food preferences with them when they migrate and that 
the intensity of these preferences depends on whether both husband and wife are 
migrants. Second, I combine these preference results with my caloric tax findings. 
Sections IVC and IVD show that the heterogeneity in the size of the migrant caloric 
tax is related to the suitability and intensity of the migrant household’s origin-state 
food preferences: the caloric tax is only present when the average bundle of the 
migrant’s origin state provides fewer calories than the local bundle (both priced 
at the local price vector), and it increases in size when both husband and wife are 
migrants. This chain of evidence suggests that Indian migrants consume fewer cal-
ories than nonmigrants because they prefer to purchase the favored products from 
their origin state even when these products are relatively expensive compared to 
local alternatives.
A. Migrants Bring Their Food Preferences with Them
In this subsection, I test the hypothesis that, compared to other households living 
in the same village, a migrant household’s consumption bundle more closely resem-
bles the average bundle of their origin state.
I first present a simpler specification that just focuses on rice and wheat. I test 
whether a migrant’s rice consumption relates to rice consumption in their origin 
state. As in the economics of culture literature, I can just focus on migrants and test 
whether migrants from rice-loving states spend more on rice than migrants in the 
same village who come from wheat-loving states. Alternatively, I can test whether 
migrants from states that are more rice-loving than their current state spend more 
on rice than locals.
I regress rice’s share of total household rice and wheat expenditure,  
ric e i  _ 
ric e i  + whea t i , 
on the average rice share of their origin state,  
ric e i o  _  
ric e i o + whea t i o , a measure of the house-
hold’s relative preference for rice and wheat based on their origin state (where the 
origin state  o average is calculated using nonmigrant households interviewed in the 
same survey round as household  i ),
(2)  ric e i  _  
ric e i  + whea t i = α 1  
ric e i o ___________  
ric e i o + whea t i o +  d  vt +  Π t X i +  ε i . 
For nonmigrants, the origin-state rice share is the average rice share of their current 
state. The regression also includes village fixed effects,  d  vt , and the vector  X i of 
household-level controls used in Section III.
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I first restrict attention only to migrant households. Since I include village fixed 
effects, a positive  α 1 coefficient indicates that migrants who moved from states that 
are more rice-loving than the origin states of other migrants in their village consume 
a larger share of rice than other migrants (and vice versa for migrants from more 
wheat-loving states). In column 1 of Table 5, I find support for the hypothesis with 
a positive and highly significant estimate of  α 1 equal to 0.189. With all villagers 
included, a positive  α 1 coefficient indicates that migrants who moved from states 
that are more rice-loving than their destination state consume a larger share of rice 
compared to the locals in their village. Column 2 of Table 5 reports this regression. 
Once more, I find a positive and highly significant estimate of  α 1 (here equal to 
0.123).18
Although informative, such an exercise only considers two types of food. If I 
wish to consider all 169 foods, I could repeat the exercise above for each food and 
then aggregate the coefficients. However, the preponderance of zero quantities for 
many of the less-consumed foods means that it is difficult to compare consumption 
across households within the same village on a good-by-good basis.19
18 If all households allocated expenditures on rice and wheat in the same proportions as the average household 
in their origin state, the  α 1 coefficient would equal 1. The smaller coefficient may be a result of either migrant adap-
tation to local preferences, or preferences that are not Cobb-Douglas. 
19 If I regress food-budget shares for each food on the average food-budget share for that food in the household’s 
origin state and the controls in equation (2), 145 of the 180 coefficients are positive and 72 are significant at the 
5 percent level. 
Table 5—Comparing Bundles of Migrants and Nonmigrants
Dependent variable:
Rice expenditure share
 rice i /( rice i +  wheat i )
Correlation  
 corr id of  
household i  
budget shares  
with budget 
shares of current 
state d
(3)
Correlation  corr i o v  of household  
i budget shares with the average  
budget shares of the origin states  o v  






















 rice i 
o /( rice i o +  wheat i o ) 0.189*** 0.123***(0.0204) (0.0146)
 migrant i −0.0111***(0.00199)
 migrant i 
 o v  0.0226*** 0.0355*** 0.0103***
(0.00290) (0.00285) (0.00284)
Observations 14,156 226,472 235,126 108,743 36,635 23,397
Within R2 0.065 0.007 0.080 0.098 0.142 0.062
Food expenditure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 controls
Alternative expenditure No No No No No No
 controls
Demographics/house- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 hold type
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Village- o v -round FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
(Continued )
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Instead, I propose an intuitive and transparent measure of preference similarity based 
on correlations between household consumption bundles and a reference consumption 
bundle for a particular state. I calculate  cor r is    ≡ corr (bshare i , bshar e i s) , the cor-
relation between the vector of 169 food-budget shares of household  i ( bshare i ) and 
the vector of average food-budget shares of a particular state  s ( bshar e i s). As with 
the rice-wheat specification, the state-averages are calculated using only nonmigrant 
households interviewed in the same survey round as household  i (hence the need for 
an  i superscript on  bshar e i s). This budget share correlation naturally over-weights the 
food items with high budget shares, a desirable property if I want to explore the link 
between preference differences and differences in total caloric intake.20
20 To see this, note that the correlation between vectors  x and  y is equal to  ∑    ( x j y j  −  x –y –) / (n − 1) s  x  s y where  x –
and  s x denote the mean and standard deviation of vector  x . The mean budget share for any vector is equal to  1/169 . 
Table 5—Comparing Bundles of Migrants and Nonmigrants (Continued )
Dependent variable:
Correlation  corr i o v  of household i budget shares with the average budget shares of 





shares of origin 




















with ln K 
difference
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
 migrant i 
 o v  0.0225*** 0.0215*** 0.0223*** 0.0171*** 0.0217*** 0.0270*** 0.0263***
(0.00293) (0.00299) (0.00296) (0.00287) (0.00245) (0.00379) (0.00334)
 migrant i 
 o v  × −0.0142**
 1[ln K ( bshare i o ,  P i v ) (0.00617)
 < ln K ( bshare i v ,  P i v ) ]
Observations 108,726 108,737 108,743 108,696 108,638 105,810 108,743
Within R2 0.074 0.135 0.066 0.104 0.092 0.096 0.060
Food expenditure No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
 controls
Alternative expenditure Yes Yes Yes No No No No
 controls
Demographics/household Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 type
Village- o v -round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 regress rice’s share of household rice and wheat expenditures on the average rice share of 
the household’s origin state, with column 1 restricting attention only to migrants (where rice and wheat expendi-
ture includes all 12 of the rice and wheat-based products in the surveys). Column 3 regresses  corr id , the correlation 
between household i’s vector of food budget shares and the vector of mean budget shares of nonmigrant house-
holds in household i’s current state d, on a migrant dummy. Dependent variable in columns 4 to 12 is the correlation 
between household i’s vector of food budget shares and the vector of mean budget shares for nonmigrant house-
holds in state  o v , where state  o v is the origin state of a migrant in the household’s village. The independent variable 
is  migrant i 
 o v  (a dummy for whether the household head or their spouse is an interstate migrant from  o v ). All specifi-
cations include either village-round or village- o v -round fixed effects and flexible survey-round-specific controls for 
household size, demographics, and type as well as a third-order polynomial in log per capita food expenditure (bar 
columns 7 to 9 which use alternate expenditure controls). Column 5 restricts attention to migrant households in vil-
lages with multiple migrant origin states. Column 6 restricts attention to households with wives who moved at the 
time of marriage, column 10 excludes the foods commonly sold through the Public Distribution System, column 
11 matches households to a reference basket calculated separately by expenditure-quartile, column 12 includes an 
additional interaction with an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the migrant’s origin-state bundle provides 
fewer calories than the local bundle, and column 13 uses caloric shares in lieu of budget shares for the dependent 
variable. All regressions are weighted using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the 
village-round and origin-state level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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These  cor r is correlations measure the similarity between household  i ’s prefer-
ences and the average preferences of nonmigrants in state  s .21 I test whether migrant 
and nonmigrants possess the same preferences by comparing the size of these cor-
relations across households that face the same price vector.
As a first step, I test whether, compared to other households living in the same 
village, a migrant’s consumption bundle less closely resembles the average bundle 
of their current state of residence. I regress the correlation  cor r id of a household’s 
bundle with their current-state bundle (labeled state  d as it is a migrant’s “destina-
tion” state) on a migrant-household dummy,
(3)  cor r id =  β 1 migran t i +  d  vt +  Π t X i +  ε id . 
Once again, I include village fixed effects,  d  vt , and household-level controls,  X i . A 
negative value of  β 1 indicates that migrant households consume bundles that are less 
similar to the current-state bundle (in comparison to nonmigrant households in the 
village). As shown in column 3 of Table 5, I find support for this sign prediction with 
an estimated coefficient of −0.0111. I can reject the null hypothesis, that migrants 
do not differ from nonmigrants in the manner described above ( β 1    ≥   0 ), at the 
1 percent level.22
The finding that migrants possess different preferences than nonmigrants does 
not necessarily imply that migrants bring with them preferences for the specific 
foods of their origin state. I now test this hypothesis. I focus only on villages with 
migrants living in them, and compare the similarity of the bundles of both migrants 
and nonmigrants in the village to the migrant’s origin-state bundle. To do this, I 
switch correlation measures to the correlation  cor r i o v  of a household’s bundle with 
the bundle of the origin state of migrants within their village (where  o v indicates the 
origin state of migrants in village  v , distinct from the  o superscript which indicates 
the origin state of the household itself). I regress this correlation on a dummy vari-
able  migran t i  o v  indicating a household that contains a migrant from state  o v ,
(4)  cor r i o v  =  γ 1 migran t i  o v  +  d  v o v  t +  Π t X i +  ε i o v  . 
Villages may have multiple origin states  o v if there are migrants from more than one 
state living there. In this scenario, there are multiple observations per household, 
one for each origin state in the village. Therefore, I include a separate  village fixed 
Therefore “outlier” foods with high average budget shares will typically have larger values for  ∑    ( x j y j  −  x –y –) and 
hence be more influential. 
21 If households have Cobb-Douglas preferences,  u = Π g=1 169 c g  θ g  with  ∑ g=1 169 θ g = 1 (where  c g is the consump-
tion and  θ g the preference parameter for food  g ), my preference-similarity measure is the correlation between a 
household’s preference parameters and the average preference parameters of nonmigrants in state  s . Atkin (2013) 
proposes an alternative approach that allows for non-homotheticities and budget shares that respond to prices. 
However, estimating migrant preferences in this manner is infeasible in this context since there are very few 
migrants on any particular route. 
22 The negative coefficient on  migran t i is partly mechanical since average budget shares of state  d were calcu-
lated using only nonmigrant households. Although this bias is likely to be small (the average state-round sample 
contains 3,700 nonmigrant households), I can reproduce the regression using average bundles calculated using all 
households where such a bias is absent. The  β 1 coefficient remains significantly negative at the 1 percent level, 
rising only slightly to −0.0106. 
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effect for each origin state in each village,  d v o v t , in addition to the set of house-
hold-level controls used in the previous specifications.23 A positive value of  γ 1 indi-
cates that migrant households originally from origin state  o v consume bundles that 
are more similar to the bundle of that particular origin state  o v (in comparison to how 
similar the bundles of neighboring households not from  o v are to the bundle of origin 
state  o v ). As shown in column 4 of Table 5, the data support this sign prediction. I 
estimate a positive coefficient of 0.0226 and can reject the null hypothesis at the 1 
percent level. Compared to other households living in the same village, a migrant’s 
consumption bundle more closely resembles the average bundle of the migrant’s 
origin state.
I assess the magnitudes of the coefficients in the following manner. On average, 
migrants still consume bundles that are more closely correlated with the reference 
bundle of their current state than their origin state (the average correlations are 
0.7270 and 0.6712 respectively). However, for comparable nonmigrant households, 
the gap between the two correlations is substantially larger (the  β 1 and  γ 1 coeffi-
cients imply that the current-state correlation is 0.0111 higher and the migrant-state 
correlation is 0.2226 lower). Therefore, migrants close about 40 percent of this dis-
similarity gap (i.e., the gap between the correlation with the current state bundle and 
the correlation with the migrant state bundle).
Since there are villages containing migrants from multiple states, I can rerun the 
regression in equation (4) only on migrant households. Such an approach mitigates 
concerns that my results are driven by migrant and nonmigrant households system-
atically differing on unobservables. In this case, the interpretation of a positive  γ 1 
coefficient is that, compared to migrants from other states living in the same village, 
a migrant from  o v ’s bundle is more similar to state  o v ’s average bundle. As shown 
in column 5 of Table 5, I find a significant and larger positive coefficient of 0.0355 
when I restrict attention only to migrants.
Columns 6 through 10 of Table 5 run the regression specified in equation (4) for 
the wife moved for marriage sample, for the alternative expenditure specifications, 
and for the subset of non-PDS foods. In addition to these robustness checks, my 
findings are robust to using two alternative preference-similarity measures. First, 
migrant households may come from different parts of the income distribution than 
the average household in their origin state. Since migrants are not observed before 
their migration, any correction is necessarily imperfect. Column 11 presents one 
such correction. I recalculate the reference bundles using nonmigrant households 
in the same national expenditure quartile as household  i (again in the round that the 
household was surveyed). Therefore, I compare the correlation between a house-
hold’s bundle and the bundle consumed in state  o v by households at similar expen-
diture levels. Second, although budget shares have the appealing feature that they 
map directly into parameters of the utility function if food preferences are of the 
Cobb-Douglas form, column 13 calculates the correlations using vectors of caloric 
shares instead (where a caloric share is a food item’s share of household caloric 
23 As previously, I two-way cluster at the village-round and origin state  o of the household. An alternative is 
to cluster at the village-round and  o v -state level. Clustering at the household level is also sensible since there are 
multiple observations per household. The standard errors are very similar under the first two clustering procedures, 
and smaller with household-level clustering. Therefore, I report the more conservative standard errors that use the 
first procedure. 
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consumption). Results are similar across all the robustness specifications, with  γ 1 
significantly positive in every regression.
Finally, online Appendix Table C5 reports these correlation results for the var-
ious subsamples of poor and undernourished households detailed in Section IIIB. 
Mirroring the caloric tax results, I find positive (and significant) coefficients across 
the various subsamples.24
In summary, migrant households bring their origin-state food preferences with 
them when they migrate.25 These food preferences may be related to observable ori-
gin-state characteristics such as prices, temperature, and income. However, I interpret 
them as cultural food preferences as they persist after migration when migrants face a 
new set of prices and external conditions, and they are purged of differences in current 
expenditure and other household-level characteristics through a rich set of controls.
B. The Number of Migrants in the Household Increases the Intensity  
of Preferences
If the results of the previous subsection are driven by cultural preferences for the 
foods of a migrant’s origin state, I expect more pronounced effects when there are 
multiple migrants with non-local preferences in the household. In this subsection, I 
show that there are stronger preferences for origin-state foods when both husband 
and wife are migrants as opposed to only one of the two.
Table 6 explores the heterogeneity across these within-household migrant struc-
tures. I allow the coefficient on the migrant dummy in equation (4) to vary with 
household structure by interacting  migran t i  o v  with dummies for the migrant status of 
the household head and their spouse: (i) only one of either the head or spouse is a 
migrant ( onlyon e i ); (ii) both the head and spouse are migrants ( bot h i ); or (iii) there 
is no spouse ( nospous e i ). Since households with no spouse may differ from other 
households more generally, I also include the no spouse dummy in the controls. 
Equation (4) becomes
(5)  cor r i o v   =   γ 1 migran t i  o v  × onlyon e i +  γ 2 migran t i  o v   × bot h i
 +  γ 3 migran t i  o v   ×  nospous e i  +   d v o v t  +   π 1t nospous e i  +   Π t X i  +   ε i o v  . 
The  γ coefficients from this specification provide separate estimates of the sim-
ilarity of migrant bundles to their origin-state bundle for each of these three types 
of migrant household. The hypothesis at the start of the subsection corresponds to 
 γ 2 >  γ 1 : the similarity of migrant consumption bundles to their origin-state ref-
erence bundle (compared to the similarity of nonmigrant bundles to the same ref-
erence bundle) is stronger when both husband and wife are migrants, and weaker 
when only one is a migrant. I find support for this hypothesis in row 1 of Table 6. 
24 The two exceptions are the bottom-quartile columns 6 and 8 where the sample size shrinks by more than 90 
percent. 
25 Online Appendix Table C6 provides a related piece of evidence that migrants are more likely to grow the 
crops that are commonly grown in their origin state (using the forty-third round survey that asked whether a house-
hold cultivates each of 8 major crops). 
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When only one of the husband and wife is a migrant, I obtain a coefficient on the 
migrant dummy of 0.0079. In contrast the size of the caloric tax is significantly 
larger when both husband and wife are migrants (a coefficient of 0.0416). I can 
reject the null that the coefficients on  migran t i  o v  × onlyon e i and  migran t i  o v  × bot h i 
are equal at the 1 percent level.
In summary, migrant households exhibit stronger preferences for the foods of 
their origin state if both husband and wife are migrants as opposed to only one of 
the two.26
26 The focus on the migrant status of the household head and spouse, as opposed to all household members, 
seems appropriate. If I supplement equation (4) with an interaction between the migrant dummy and the  proportion 
Table 6—Results Broken Down by Within-Household Migrant Structure
Full sample  
 of households
Variable interacted with 
 migrant-structure dummies
Only head  








(1) Dependent variable:  
 correlation c orr  io v  
 migrant i 
 o v  0.00786*** 0.0416*** 0.0331***
(0.00251) (0.00453) (0.00819) 108,743 0.100
(2) Dependent variable:  
 log caloric intake
 migrant i −0.0125*** −0.0228*** −0.0139**(0.00292) (0.00570) (0.00618) 235,126 0.732
(3) Dependent variable:  
 log caloric intake
 migrant i −0.00397 −0.00913 −0.000555(0.00376) (0.00672) (0.00662)
 migrant i × 1[ln K ( bshare i o ,  P i v ) −0.0179*** −0.0629*** −0.0359***
 < ln K ( bshare i v ,  P i v ) ] (0.00476) (0.0146) (0.0116) 234,155 0.732
Subsample of households whose primary occupation is agriculture
(4) Dependent variable:  
 log caloric intake
 migrant i 0.0105 0.0354** 0.0343*(0.00781) (0.0146) (0.0200)
 migrant i × 1[ln K ( bshare i o ,  P i v ) −0.0296*** −0.0854*** −0.0671**
 < ln K ( bshare i v ,  P i v ) ] (0.00851) (0.0239) (0.0274) 108,719 0.745
Subsample of households with caloric shortfalls of 250 calories or more
(5) Dependent variable:  
 log caloric intake
 migrant i 0.00641 −0.000969 −0.00713(0.00821) (0.00773) (0.0115)
 migrant i × 1[ln K ( bshare i o ,  P i v ) −0.0332*** −0.0512** −0.0568***
 < ln K ( bshare i v ,  P i v ) ] (0.0103) (0.0199) (0.0206)  95,910 0.627
Subsample of households with caloric shortfalls of 500 calories or more
(6) Dependent variable:  
 log caloric intake
 migrant i 0.00869 −0.0125 −0.0178(0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0174)
 migrant i × 1[ln K ( bshare i o ,  P i v ) −0.0311** −0.0405* −0.0610*
 < ln K ( bshare i v ,  P i v ) ] (0.0144) (0.0223) (0.0339) 59,457 0.622
Notes: Rows 1–6 repeat the regressions shown in Tables 3, 5, and 7 but interacting every instance of a migrant 
dummy variable with indicator variables for three mutually exclusive categories of within-household migrant struc-
ture: only one of head or spouse is a migrant, both head and spouse are migrants, and there is no spouse. Each 
panel comprises one regression. Rows 4–6 restrict attention to subsamples described in italicized heads above rows. 
Caloric shortfall defined relative to the 2,400 calorie urban/2,100 rural calorie norms. If both head and spouse are 
migrants from different origin states, I replace migran t i 
 o v  in panel 1 with the value of one half for each of the two 
origin states, and 1[ln K( bshare i o ,  P i v ) < ln K(bshar e i v , P i v )] with its average value across the two origin states in 
rows 3–6. Results are essentially unchanged if these households are dropped. As in Table 5, panel 1 includes vil-
lage- o v -round fixed effects. As in Tables 3 and 7, rows 2–6 include village-round fixed effects. All rows include 
flexible survey-round-specific controls for household size, demographics, and type as well as a third-order poly-
nomial in log  per capita food expenditure and a dummy for households where the head has no spouse. All regres-
sions are weighted using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and 
 origin-state level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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C. The Size of the Caloric Tax Depends on the Suitability of the Migrant 
Preferences
This subsection links together my two previous findings: that migrants bring their 
origin-state tastes with them and that migrants consume fewer calories per rupee 
than locals. In particular, I test the hypothesis that the size of the caloric tax is larger 
if migrants move to a village where the preferences of their specific origin state 
place them at a caloric disadvantage relative to locals.
In order to test this hypothesis, I require a measure of how calorically advanta-
geous a certain set of origin-state preferences is. Once more, I proxy the migrant’s 
origin-state preferences with their origin-state reference bundle,  bshar e i o , a vector 
of average food-budget shares of nonmigrants in their origin state. I then calculate 
ln K (bshar e i o ,  P i v ) , the log of calories derived from 1 rupee allocated in the same 
proportions as this origin-state reference bundle  bshar e i o but with foods priced at 
the destination-village price vector  P i v .27 Similarly, I calculate  ln K (bshar e i v ,  P i v ) , the 
log of calories derived from 1 rupee allocated in the same proportions as the aver-
age bundle  bshar e i v of nonmigrant households in the migrant’s destination village (also at destination-village prices). The log difference between the calories derived 
from each of these 1 rupee bundles measures the caloric advantage of a migrant’s 
origin-state preferences over the local preferences. Migrants who move to villages 
where their origin-state average bundle is a relatively expensive method of obtain-
ing calories compared to the local bundle have a negative value for this log differ-
ence. These migrant households have particularly disadvantageous preferences and 
should face a larger caloric tax compared to a migrant household for whom this log 
difference is positive.
To implement this test, I rerun my calorie regression, equation (1), except I 
now interact the migrant dummy with an indicator variable,  1 [ln K (bshar e i o ,  P i v ) < ln K (bshar e i v ,  P i v )] , that takes the value of 1 for negative values of the log differ-
ence described above,28
(6)  ln calorie s i =  β 1 migran t i +  β 2 migran t i 
 ×  1 [ln K (bshar e i o ,  P i v )  <  ln K (bshar e i v ,  P i v )]  +   d vt  +   Π t X i  +   ε i . 
The values of the log differences range from −0.55 for the first percentile of migrants 
to 0.95 for the ninety-ninth percentile, with negative values for a quarter of migrant 
households. As before, I include village-round fixed effects,  d vt , and the vector  X i of 
household controls described in Section III.
of household members that are migrants, the interaction term is positive and highly significant. However, if I also 
include the migrant structure dummies used in equation (5), the proportion-of-migrants interaction term is no 
longer significant. 
27 I obtain the vector  P i v by treating unit values (the expenditure on a food divided by the quantity purchased) 
as price data. Unit values are not actual prices since quality varies. In part because of this concern, I use median 
village prices as my price measure. These prices are robust to outliers and are less contaminated by quality effects. 
I exclude migrant households from these median calculations to avoid issues arising from migrants paying different 
prices. If none of the resulting village sample purchase a good, I use the median price at an incrementally higher 
level of aggregation. 
28 Note that no variable used to calculate this indicator variable uses budget share or price data from migrant 
household  i . 
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The hypothesis at the start of the subsection corresponds to  β 2 < 0 : the caloric 
tax is more negative if a migrant’s origin-state bundle provides relatively few cal-
ories per rupee compared to the local bundle. Column 1 of Table 7 presents the 
results of this regression. I can reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. 
The estimated  β 2 coefficient is significantly negative and equal to −0.0267. The 
main effect,  β 1 , is insignificant and close to zero. Migrants only pay a caloric tax 
if they live in a village where purchasing their origin-state reference bundle pro-
vides fewer calories than the local bundle. Summing the two coefficients, I find that 
migrant households living in villages where their preferences are badly suited to the 
local price vector consume 3.23 percent fewer calories than comparable nonmigrant 
households (with a 95 percent confidence interval between 2.41 and 4.06 percent).
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 present alternative specifications for the  ln K (., .) 
interaction. Column 2 allows the caloric tax to vary for migrants in each quartile of 
the  ln K (., .) difference. The largest caloric tax of 3.93 percent is faced by migrant 
households in the bottom quartile. The size of the caloric tax becomes progres-
sively smaller for households in the second and third quartiles and becomes signifi-
cantly positive for the top quartile.29 This top quartile of migrants have the most 
advantageous origin-state preferences and receive a caloric dividend rather than 
pay a caloric tax. In terms of magnitudes, these households consume 2.11 percent 
more calories per rupee than their nonmigrant neighbors. Column 3 interacts the 
migrant dummy with  ln K (bshar e i o ,  P i v )  − ln K (bshar e i v ,  P i v ) , a continuous measure 
of a migrant’s caloric advantage over locals. I find a positive and significant coeffi-
cient of 0.06: the size of the caloric tax increases with the caloric disadvantage of a 
migrant’s origin-state preferences.30
As in Section IVA, I rerun these specifications restricting attention only to migrant 
households. Results are reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 7. As with the full sam-
ple, I find that within villages that contain migrants from multiple states, migrant 
households from states with more advantageous origin-state preferences consume a 
greater number of calories per rupee of food expenditure than those from states with 
less advantageous preferences.31
I present many robustness checks and results for poor and undernourished subpop-
ulations. Table 7 reports my findings using the wife moved for marriage subsample; 
only rice and wheat calories; alternative expenditure controls; occupation, industry, 
meals served, and meals out controls; only non-PDS foods;  expenditure-quartile 
29 A negative tax for small positive values of the  ln K (., .) difference (i.e., quartiles two and three) is not surpris-
ing. First, the origin-state bundle is an imperfect measure of preferences unless the utility function takes the form 
in footnote 21, is permanent and is identical for everyone in the state. If richer households obtain fewer calories per 
rupee due to non-homotheticities and income rises with migration, the true  ln K (., .) difference is more negative. 
Second, if migrants pay higher prices than nonmigrants, the caloric advantage of the origin-state bundle is actually 
a small disadvantage when priced at the prices migrants pay rather than at village (nonmigrant) median prices. For 
example, if I just price the bundle at village median prices that include rather than exclude migrants, I find similar 
results, but here the second quartile corresponds to negative  ln K (., .) differences. 
30 The fact that the coefficient is substantially smaller than one implies that either migrants adapt their pref-
erences after migrating, not all household members possess such preferences, or preferences are not of the 
 Cobb-Douglas/identical-within-state form. I provide some explicit evidence for the first two of these explanations 
in later sections. 
31 Since I am restricting attention to migrants, in column 4 the fourth quartile dummy is omitted and the results 
on the other quartiles are relative to the omitted quartile. Using an indicator variable for whether migrant pref-
erences are more or less advantageous than local preferences is not appropriate here since I am not comparing 
migrants to locals. 
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adjusted reference baskets; instrumented food expenditure; and replacing calories 
with calories per rupee calculated using either actual or village median prices. Online 
Appendix Table C7 presents results for poor and undernourished subpopulations. In 
all the specifications, I find a significantly negative  β 2 coefficient. The magnitudes 
for migrants with disadvantageous preferences range from a caloric tax of 1.92 per-
cent for households below median expenditure, to a caloric tax of 3.35 percent for 
households 250 or more calories below the per person per day caloric norms.
Table 7—Comparing the Caloric Intake of Migrants and Nonmigrants across Migration Routes


















excluded(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 migrant i −0.00564 0.00568(0.00423) (0.00422)
 migrant i × 1[ln K ( bshare i o ,  P i v ) −0.0267*** −0.0823*** < ln K ( bshare i v ,  P i v ) ] (0.00574) (0.0123)
 migrant i −0.0393*** −0.0162 −0.0827***
 × 1st quartile [ln K(., .)-ln K(., .)] (0.00547) (0.0152) (0.0120)
 migrant i −0.0186*** −0.0224* −0.0311***
 × 2nd quartile [ln K(., .)-ln K(., .)] (0.00446) (0.0134) (0.00980)
 migrant i −0.0130** −0.0179** 0.00694
 × 3rd quartile [ln K(., .)-ln K(., .)] (0.00572) (0.00869) (0.00571)
 migrant i 0.0211*** 0.0371***
 × 4th quartile [ln K(., .)-ln K(., .)] (0.00518) (0.00675)
 migrant i × (ln K ( bshare i o ,  P i v ) 0.0600*** 0.0395* − ln K ( bshare i v ,  P i v ) ) (0.0112) (0.0226)
Observations 234,157 234,157 234,157 14,186 14,186 234,099 234,099
Within R2 0.731 0.732 0.731 0.721 0.721 0.729 0.729
Food expenditure controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Alternative expenditure controls No No No No No No No
Demographics/household type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 controls
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes


























(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
 migrant i −0.00178 0.00672** −0.00282 −0.00318 −0.00633 −0.00314 −0.00301
(0.00514) (0.00337) (0.00506) (0.00578) (0.00431) (0.00447) (0.00426)
 migrant i × 1[ln K ( bshare i o ,  P i v ) −0.0208*** −0.0286*** −0.0280*** −0.0219*** −0.0274*** −0.0263*** −0.0227*** < ln K ( bshare i v ,  P i v ) ] (0.00727) (0.00410) (0.00608) (0.00687) (0.00597) (0.00577) (0.00541)
Observations 91,158 225,587 234,135 234,153 234,157 229,120 233,993
Within R2 0.718 0.905 0.521 0.676 0.723 0.830 0.711
Food expenditure controls Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Alternative expenditure controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Demographics/household type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 controls
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Continued )
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Online Appendix Table C7 also contains results using other nutrition measures 
as the dependent variable. Migrants with disadvantageous preferences are 1.4 per-
cent more likely than local non migrants to consume fewer calories than the recom-
mended calorie norms (a t-statistic of 2.0) and 2.6 percent more likely to consume 
500 fewer calories than recommended (a t-statistic of 3.4), and these findings hold 
even for households with children. This set of migrants also consume 0.6 percent 
fewer meals (a t-statistic of 1.8) and are 0.6 percent less likely to obtain two square 
meals a day (but here the t-statistic is an insignificant 0.9, in part due to the smaller 
sample size as this question is asked only in round 38).
Table 7—Comparing the Caloric Intake of Migrants and Nonmigrants across  
Migration Routes (Continued )
Dependent variable:
log calories per rupee  
of food expenditure
log caloric 
















basket by  
destination 
state(15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
 migrant i −0.00454 −0.00125 −0.00727 0.0157 −0.0103**(0.00424) (0.00415) (0.00467) (0.0220) (0.00504)
 migrant i × 1[ln K ( bshare i o ,  P i v ) −0.0259*** −0.0348*** −0.0254*** −0.0251*** −0.0108*
 < ln K ( bshare i v ,  P i v ) ] (0.00621) (0.00680) (0.00637) (0.00601) (0.00578)
 migrant i −0.00399
 ×  ln distance ov (0.00386)
Observations 234,135 234,135 231,774 213,444 235,004
Within R2 0.325 0.307 0.731 0.732 0.732
Food expenditure controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Alternative expenditure controls Yes Yes No No No
Demographics/household type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 controls
Village-round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is log caloric intake per person per day (except columns 15 and 16 where it is log 
caloric intake per rupee of food expenditure, with calories priced at village median prices in the latter two cases). 
Independent variables are  migran t i , a migrant household dummy, and  migran t i interacted with an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if a 1 rupee reference bundle from the migrant’s origin state provides fewer calories than a 1 rupee 
reference bundle from the migrants destination village (both priced at destination-village prices). All specifications 
include village-round fixed effects and flexible survey-round-specific controls for household size, demographics, 
and type as well as a third-order polynomial in log per capita food expenditure (except columns 10 to 12 and 15 
to 16 which use alternate expenditure controls). Column 1 reports the baseline specification. Columns 2 and 3 use 
alternative functions of these calorie differences. Columns 4 and 5 report these alternative functions restricting 
attention only to migrant households in villages with multiple migrant origin states. Columns 6 and 7 exclude the 
foods commonly sold through the Public Distribution System. Column 8 restricts attention to households in which 
the wife moved village at the time of marriage and compares interstate to intrastate movers. Column 9 uses only 
calories from rice and wheat products. Column 13 includes round dummies interacted with controls for the occupa-
tion of the household head (643 categories), industry of head (526 categories), the ratio of meals served to guests 
and employees to those consumed by household members at home, and the ratio of meals consumed by household 
members outside the house to those consumed inside the house. Column 14 instruments total food expenditure with 
total non-food expenditure. Column 17 matches households to a reference basket calculated separately by expendi-
ture-quartile. Column 18 includes an interaction with the distance between a migrant’s destination region and their 
origin state. Column 19 uses a state-specific reference bundle for the local bundle. All regressions are weighted 
using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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I perform two additional robustness tests that address particular concerns with 
this exercise. One concern is that the  ln K (., .) difference is related to the distance 
migrants have traveled and migrants from far-off places differ from other migrants 
in some unobservable way. I address this concern by including an additional inter-
action between  migran t i and the log distance between the migrant’s destination 
region (a subset of their state) and their origin state. The coefficient on the distance 
interaction is insignificant while the  β 2 coefficient is essentially unchanged (column 
18 of Table 7). A second concern is that measurement error in  ln calorie s i will be 
correlated with measurement error in  ln K (bshar e i v ,  P i v ) for nonmigrant households (recall that  ln K (bshar e i v ,  P i v ) is the average calories per rupee for nonmigrants in 
the village). The average state-round sample contains 3,700 nonmigrant households 
and so any bias due to measurement error should be small at higher levels of disag-
gregation. Accordingly, column 19 calculates the  ln K (., .) difference using average 
bundles at the state level instead of at the village level (still pricing the bundles at 
destination-village prices). The  β 2 coefficient remains negative and significant in 
this specification.
In summary, I establish a clear link between a migrant’s preferences and the 
caloric tax, with the size of the tax related to the suitability of a migrant’s origin-state 
preferences to the local price vector.
D. The Size of the Caloric Tax Depends on the Intensity of the Migrant Preferences
In Section IVB, I showed that household preferences for origin-state foods are 
more intense if both husband and wife are migrants. In this subsection, I present the 
corresponding result for caloric intake: that the migrant caloric tax is larger if both 
husband and wife are migrants as opposed to just one.
I interact the migrant terms in the caloric tax specification, equation (1), with the 
same set of migrant-structure dummies I used in Section IVB:
(7)  ln calorie s i =  β 1 migran t i × onlyon e i + β 2 migran t i × bot h i 
 +   β 3 migran t i  ×  nospous e i  +  d  vt  +   π 1t  nospous e i  +   Π t X i  +   ε i . 
The  β coefficients provide separate estimates for the caloric tax faced by migrants 
for each of these three structures. Row 2 of Table 6 reports these regression coeffi-
cients. The results mirror the findings of Section IVB. When only one of the husband 
and wife is a migrant, I obtain a coefficient on the migrant dummy of −0.0125. In 
contrast, the size of the caloric tax is significantly more negative when both husband 
and wife are migrants, a coefficient of −0.0228.32
Row 3 of Table 6 performs a similar breakdown for equation (6). For each of 
the three migrant structures, I find that the size of the caloric tax is larger when 
the migrant’s origin-state reference bundle provides fewer calories per rupee than 
the local bundle (both priced at the local price vector). As above, the tax is also 
32 I reject the null that the coefficients on  migran t i × onlyon e i and  migran t i × bot h i are equal with a p-value of 
5.3 percent. 
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 significantly smaller if only one of the head and spouse are migrants compared to if 
both are migrants.33 The most adversely affected households—households in which 
both husband and wife migrated to a village where their origin-state reference bun-
dle provides fewer calories than the local bundle—face a caloric tax of 7.20 percent 
(with a 95 percent confidence interval between 5.01 and 9.39 percent).
The magnitude of this caloric tax is substantial. The median caloric intake for this 
migrant subgroup is 2,156 calories per person per day with 57 percent of households 
consuming less than the recommended calorie norms (2,400 calories rural, 2,100 
urban). If these migrants had the same preferences as locals, the median would rise 
to 2,317 calories and the percentage of households below the norms would fall to 
46 percent. To provide a mapping to economic outcomes, I draw on Schofield’s 
(2014) estimates of the productivity decline among Indian farmers due to caloric 
reductions among Muslims during Ramadan. She estimates that the approximate 
700 calorie decline due to Ramadan (also measured using NSS surveys) lowered 
agricultural productivity by between 20 and 40 percent. Crudely extrapolating this 
effect size, the 7.2 percent caloric tax would reduce agricultural productivity by 
between 4.9 and 9.8 percent. Row 4 of Table 6 reruns the regression above on agri-
cultural households, and finds a caloric tax of 5.0 percent for households in the most 
affected subgroup (i.e., where both husbands and wives migrated and origin-state 
bundles are relatively expensive). Applying Schofield’s (2014) estimates on this 
potentially more appropriate sample suggests a reduction in agricultural productiv-
ity of between 3.6 and 7.2 percent.
As earlier, these effects are not limited to better-nourished households. Rows 5 
and 6 of Table 6 rerun the specification on the subsamples of malnourished house-
holds consuming either 250 or 500 calories less than the caloric norms. The size of 
the caloric tax for these households in which both husband and wife are migrants 
with unsuitable preferences remains a sizeable 5.2 and 5.3 percent, respectively.
In summary, I find strong evidence that culture can constrain caloric intake. I 
show that migrants bring their food preferences with them, and that the caloric tax is 
larger when the favored foods of their origin state are expensive compared to local 
alternatives. Further corroborating a food-culture explanation, the migrant house-
holds that pay the largest caloric tax are those with multiple migrants possessing 
preferences unsuited to the local price vector.
V. Alternative Explanations
I have shown that migrants bring their food preferences with them and that the 
size of the caloric tax is related to the suitability of a migrant’s origin-state prefer-
ences to local prices. These findings are inconsistent with a story in which migrant 
preferences differ from those of nonmigrants but in a manner unrelated to their 
cultural origins. However, these findings do not contradict a story where migrants 
possess better information or technology, rather than stronger preferences, for the 
foods of their origin state.
33 I can reject the null that the caloric tax for migrants with unsuited preferences is equal for these two types of 
households at the 1 percent level. 
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A. An Information Story
The first alternative explanation is that migrants have poor information about 
local prices or the availability and nutritional properties of local alternatives to their 
origin-state foods. Under these scenarios, migrants would consume fewer calories 
per rupee than nonmigrants as they are unaware of cheaper alternatives. Migrants 
may also consume bundles that more closely resemble the origin-state bundle they 
are more familiar with. I provide five pieces of evidence that contradict this infor-
mation-based explanation.
First, I document that the caloric tax is persistent and remains many years after 
migration. Even if migrants are initially uninformed, after many years in the desti-
nation village they would become familiar with the local foods and prices. I rerun 
my main regression specifications on subpopulations that exclude recent migrants. 
Specifically, I exclude migrant households where the most recent migrant arrived 
less than 5, 10, or 20 years prior to the survey. Columns 13 to 15 of Table 4 present 
these three regressions for the basic calorie specification, equation (1). The caloric 
tax remains significantly negative for the first two long-term migrant specifica-
tions, although the size of the tax declines. When I exclude all migrants who arrived 
less than 20 years previously, the tax disappears altogether. However, the specifi-
cations from Section IV tell a more complete story. Although the coefficients are 
 progressively attenuated as I remove the more recent migrants, long-term migrants 
still consume bundles more closely related to their origin-state bundle than locals 
do, and still pay a caloric tax if they move to locations where their origin-state 
bundle provides fewer calories per rupee than the local bundle.34 Therefore, even 
migrants who have had many years to learn about local foods and prices pay a 
caloric tax when their origin-state preferences are unsuited to the local price vector.
Second, I find a migrant caloric tax when only one of the husband or wife are 
migrants (row 1 of Table 6), and even when wives are moving to their husband’s 
village (column 2 of Table 3). In these cases, other household members already pos-
sess information about local foods and prices yet the caloric tax remains.
Third, in Indian society it is typically women who are in charge of the purchase 
and preparation of foods. Therefore, under an information-driven story the caloric 
tax should be stronger if wives rather than husbands are migrants. On the other hand, 
in India, men typically have greater bargaining power in household decision-mak-
ing; therefore, under a preference-driven story, the caloric impacts due to a migrant 
in the household will be stronger if the husband is a migrant as opposed to the wife. 
I evaluate these two competing hypotheses in panels 1 to 3 of online Appendix Table 
C8 which presents similar specifications to Table 6 but breaks the “only one” cate-
gory into two: only the head is a migrant and only the spouse is a migrant. I find no 
support for the information story. Across each of the three regressions, the ordering 
of the coefficients accords with the preference-driven story above (i.e., I find larger 
correlations and caloric taxes if the husband is a migrant as opposed to the wife). 
For example, the size of the caloric tax for migrants moving to locations where 
their origin-state bundle provides fewer calories than the local bundle is 1.9 percent 
34 These results are shown in columns 13 to 15 of online Appendix Tables C5 and C7. For migrants who left 20 
or more years ago the size of the tax is 1.66 percent (significant at the 5 percent level). 
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when only the spouse is a migrant and rises to 3.3 percent when only the husband 
is a migrant (a difference of 1.4 percent).35 I also allow the size of the tax to differ 
by the migrant’s region of origin in online Appendix Table C9. Consistent with the 
stylized fact that there is a north-south gradient in both patrilocality and attitudes 
toward women, the difference between the migrant-husband and migrant-spouse 
caloric tax is largest in the north (a difference of 2.8 percent), smallest in the south 
(a difference of −0.2 percent), and of intermediate value in the center of India (a 
difference of 1.4 percent).
One possible explanation for these findings is that the husband’s mother is in 
charge of household food purchases and preparation and that husbands bring their 
mothers when they migrate. Under this scenario, I would find larger caloric taxes 
if the husband is a migrant even under a pure information story. However, the hus-
band’s mother is only present in 13.6 percent of households where the husband 
and not the spouse is a migrant, and results are essentially unchanged when these 
households are excluded.36
Fourth, if the explanation is that migrants have poor information, the caloric tax 
is likely to be smaller among literate segments of the population who can acquire 
information more easily. I find the opposite relationship in the data. Column 16 of 
Table 4 restricts attention to households in which the household head is literate. The 
size of the caloric tax actually grows larger when I focus on this subpopulation.
Finally, inconsistent with a story where migrants are simply unaware of local 
alternatives, I present evidence that migrants do adjust their purchasing behavior 
when their origin-state preferences are particularly unsuited to the local price vector 
(i.e., when their origin-state bundle is more costly than the local bundle). I return to 
the preference-similarity regression, equation (4), and interact the migrant dummy 
with an indicator for a negative value of  [ln K (bshar e i o ,  P i v )  − ln K (bshar e i v ,  P i v )] . I 
report this regression in column 12 of Table 5. I find a significantly negative coeffi-
cient on the  migran t i  o v  × 1[ln K (bshar e i o ,  P i v ) < ln K (bshar e i v ,  P i v )] interaction term 
corresponding to a 50 percent decline in the effect size. Therefore, migrants seem to 
be aware that substituting away from their origin-state foods can improve nutrition 
since they moderate their consumption choices in contexts where consumption of 
these foods is most disadvantageous. However, the adaptation is incomplete as these 
migrants still consume bundles that more closely resemble their origin-state bundle 
(i.e., the sum of the coefficient on the interaction and the coefficient on  migran t i  o v  is 
still positive and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level).
B. A Technology Story
The second alternative explanation is that migrants do not possess the technol-
ogies to make high-quality meals using locally-cheap foods. These technologies 
encompass cooking and food-preparation equipment as well as recipes and tech-
niques that turn raw foods into enjoyable meals. For example, if a family migrated 
35 I can reject the null that the only spouse caloric tax is equal or greater to the only head caloric tax at the 5 
percent level. 
36 Panels 4 to 6 of online Appendix Table C8 replaces the “only head is migrant” dummy with “only head is 
migrant and no mother in house.” 
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from a wheat to rice area, they may continue to consume wheat-based meals as they 
enjoy well-prepared meals over badly-prepared meals (rather than wheat over rice).
Once more the evidence contradicts a story in which technology is the sole 
explanation for my findings. If technology was responsible, the caloric tax should 
disappear for long-term migrants. These households have spent many years away, 
providing a sufficient time frame over which to purchase new equipment as well 
as learn new recipes and techniques. Similarly, there should be no tax for migrants 
moving into a nonmigrant household since these households should have appropri-
ate kitchen equipment and migrants can learn recipes and preparation techniques 
from other household members. Finally, as discussed above, women are typically in 
charge of food preparation in Indian households. Therefore, if a lack of recipes and 
preparation techniques were the cause of the caloric tax, the tax should be smaller 
when only the husband is a migrant compared to only the wife. As shown in the 
previous subsection, I find substantial caloric taxes for all these subpopulations and 
a larger tax for migrant husbands than for migrant wives.
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper sets out to answer a simple question: can food cultures constrain 
caloric intake and contribute to malnutrition? I address this question by exploiting 
the fact that migrants and nonmigrants face the same relative prices, yet possess 
very different preferences. Drawing on detailed household survey data from India, I 
document that interstate migrants consume fewer calories per rupee of food expen-
diture compared to their nonmigrant neighbors, even for households on the edge 
of malnutrition. I then provide a chain of evidence in support of an explanation 
based on culture: that migrants make calorically suboptimal food choices due to 
strong preferences for the favored foods of their origin states. First, I document 
that migrants bring their origin-state food preferences with them when they migrate 
and that these preferences are stronger when there are more migrants in the house-
hold. Second, I show that the heterogeneity in the size of the migrant caloric tax is 
related to the suitability and intensity of these origin-state food preferences. The 
most adversely affected migrants would consume 7 percent more calories if they 
possessed the same preferences as their neighbors.
These results provide insight into the value that households place on their culture. 
Even households on the edge of malnutrition, a population for which reductions in 
caloric intake have serious repercussions for both health and economic well-being, 
are willing to substantially reduce their caloric intake in order to accommodate their 
cultural food preferences.
Before discussing policy implications, it is important to address the fact that the 
paper uses data from the 1980s and so the findings may no longer be relevant for 
policymakers today. (Recall more recent data do not contain detailed consumption 
records matched to migration particulars.) There are several reasons to think the 
findings are still relevant. The fact that similar observations about India were made 
by the Famine Inquiry Commission in 1945 suggests these forces are persistent. 
Indeed, regional consumption patterns change little across NSS survey rounds. For 
example, I calculate the coefficient of variation of state average food-budget shares 
for each of the 135 foods that are common across surveys. The mean of these 135 
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coefficients of variation is 0.75 in 1983, 0.67 in 1987–1988, and 0.61 in 2009–
2010.37 In fact, given the increase in interstate migration in India (the percentage of 
the population born in a different state rose from 3.3 to 4.1 between 1991 and 2001, 
the last available census), the caloric tax culture imposes may be becoming more 
important not less. Finally, there is also contemporary evidence for another country, 
the United States, that migrants bring their preferences with them (Bronnenberg, 
Dube, and Gentzkow 2012).
In terms of policy, the finding that culture can constrain caloric intake has import-
ant implications for tackling hunger and malnutrition. The cultural causes of hunger 
need to be understood when designing programs to alleviate malnutrition. Three 
types of program are particularly relevant: providing food aid or price subsidies to 
consumers; reducing tariffs or using other trade policies to increase food imports; 
and developing biofortified or high-yielding variety (HYV) crops. In all three cases, 
programs will be more effective if the targeted foods are those favored by house-
holds on the edge of malnutrition.
As a concrete example, white maize is greatly preferred to yellow maize in much 
of Africa.38 However, much food aid to Africa comes in the form of imported yel-
low maize, and vitamin-A biofortification involves the addition of carotenes which 
turn maize yellow-orange. Programs that provide cheap yellow maize to hungry 
communities, or try to reduce vitamin A deficiency through biofortified maize, are 
less effective in contexts where there are cultural preferences for white maize. Food 
vouchers that allow consumers to choose their favored foods or biofortification of 
traditional foods may prove more successful in such cases. Similarly, the introduc-
tion of HYV rice, wheat, and yellow maize spurred “the green revolution” in much 
of the developing world. However, this revolution bypassed sub-Saharan Africa. 
Alongside a range of other factors (see Paarlberg 2010), adoption of these HYV 
crops was held back by strong local preferences for sub-Saharan staples such as 
sweet potato, cassava, sorghum, and white maize.
Another potential remedy, and one mooted by the Famine Inquiry Commission, 
involves facilitating preference changes through campaigns that encourage the con-
sumption of alternative foods. The commission notes that such a campaign was 
implemented in Ceylon with some success in order to increase wheat consumption 
following the blockage of rice imports during World War II. However, efforts may 
be better targeted at children who have less-rigid preferences and even then may be 
slow to yield results:
As long as rice is available, rice eaters in general will consume it in pref-
erence to other grains and in such circumstances “eat more wheat” cam-
paigns are not likely to be very effective. … Alternative cereals could be 
used for school meals. … if children learn to take such foods, they may 
carry the preference into later life. Children are more flexible in their 
dietary habits than adults. Whatever methods are adopted in the attempt 
37 I define states using 1983 state borders. For unit values, the equivalent numbers are 0.43, 0.44, and 0.49, 
respectively. 
38 See McCann (2005) for the historical origins and De Groote and Kimenju (2008) for empirical evidence of 
this preference. 
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to encourage the use of wheat in place of rice, progress is likely to be slow. (Famine Inquiry Commission 1945)
A fruitful avenue for further research would be to explore the dynamics of food 
cultures and to better understand how nutritionally-beneficial preferences develop.
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